“As President Trump has made clear, Iran’s behavior has left the country devastated. Despite every opportunity to choose peace , its leaders have chosen extremism,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent . “ Treasury will continue to target Tehran’s revenue sources and increase economic pressure to disrupt its access to the financial resources that fuel the regime’s destabilizing activities.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13902, which targets persons operating in certain sectors of the Iranian economy , including Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, and counterterrorism agency EO 13224, as amended. This is the eighth round of sanctions targeting Iran’s petroleum trade since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum No. 2, which directed a maximum pressure campaign against Iran.
At the same time, the State Department is designating six entities and identifying four vessels under Executive Order 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction involving the purchase, receipt, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
Iran-Iraq oil smuggling network
Salim Ahmed Said (Said) is a British citizen of Iraqi origin who has run a network of companies that have sold Iranian oil falsely declared as Iraqi oil since at least 2020. Said’s companies used ship-to-ship transfers and other techniques to conceal their activities. Said’s companies and ships blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil, which was then sold to Western buyers via Iraq or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as pure Iraqi oil using forged paperwork to avoid sanctions. This allowed the oil to be sold on the legitimate market and helped Iran evade international sanctions on its oil exports.
Said bribed numerous members of Iraqi government agencies, including parliament. He is believed to have paid millions of dollars in kickbacks to these officials in exchange for false documents that allowed him to sell Iranian oil as if it were of Iraqi origin.
Said was designated under Executive Order EO 13902 for his activities in the oil and gas sector of the Iranian economy.
Said controls the UAE-based company VS Tankers FZE (VS Tankers), although he has avoided formal links to the company. Formerly known as Al-Iraqia Shipping Services & Oil Trading FZE (AISSOT), VS Tankers has smuggled oil for the benefit of the Iranian government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In 2020, for example, AISSOT reportedly brokered a deal to transport Iranian oil through Iraqi pipelines to be blended and sold as Iraqi oil.
Vessels affiliated with VS Tankers have assisted Iranian oil exporters in adulterating Iranian oil with Iraqi oil to conceal the origin of the oil by engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with vessels known to be linked to Iranian oil activities. VS Tankers currently claims several tankers as part of its fleet, one of which recorded four ship-to-ship transfers with the US-sanctioned Barbados-flagged CASINOVA (IMO 9280366) in April 2024 while in the Persian Gulf near the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab River, which marks the border between Iraq and Iran. VS Tankers has acted as the operator, manager and beneficial owner of the Marshall Islands-flagged crude oil tanker DIJILAH (IMO 9829629) since 2019.
VS Tankers is designated under EO 13902 to operate in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. DIJILAH is identified under EO 13902 as property in which VS Tankers has an interest.
In 2023, Said expanded his business to include VS Oil Terminal FZE (VS Oil), which, although registered in the UAE, is based in Khor al-Zubayr, Iraq. VS Oil manages six oil storage tanks where Iranian oil is dumped to be mixed with Iraqi oil. Iranian tankers also conduct ship-to-ship transfers with Iraqi tankers in the vicinity of VS Oil’s port facilities, and the final blending of oil was authenticated by complicit Iraqi government officials. Ship tracking data shows that multiple tankers known to be transporting Iranian petroleum products on behalf of the U.S.-sanctioned Iranian oil and petrochemical brokerage Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. and the Iranian military front company Sahara Thunder have visited VS Oil. VS Oil employees smuggle hard currency into Iran in cars and trucks, some carrying millions of dollars each, to pay for the oil.
VS Oil is designated under EO 13902 to operate in the oil and gas sector of the Iranian economy.
Said also owns UAE-based VS Petroleum DMCC, formerly Ikon Petroleum DMCC, and Rhine Shipping DMCC (Rhine Shipping), which in 2022 was accused of adulterating Iranian oil to sell as Iraqi oil. Rhine Shipping was also previously found to be the manager of the US-sanctioned tanker MOLECULE, formerly known as BABEL, which loaded oil in the Persian Gulf from an Iranian tanker that had turned off its location transponder to conceal the transaction. OFAC later sanctioned MOLECURE for its role in transporting Iranian oil as part of a network of Iran-backed Houthi financier Sa’id al-Jamal.
Said also owns the UK-based companies The Willett Hotel Limited and Robinbest Limited.
VS Petroleum DMCC, Rhine Shipping, The Willett Hotel Limited and Robinbest Limited are designated under EO 13902 as companies directly or indirectly owned or controlled by Said.
Components of the “dark” fleet
Iran’s “shadow” fleet allows the regime to move oil to generate revenue. Iran relies on non-sanctioned vessels to conduct ship-to-ship transfers and pick up Iranian oil from sanctioned vessels before shipping Iranian-origin cargoes to buyers in Asia.
National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) uses Singapore-based Trans Arctic Global Marine Services PTE. LTD. (Trans Arctic Global) to arrange navigation services for NITC vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca. Trans Arctic Global has enabled NITC to transport tens of millions of barrels of Iranian oil through the Strait of Malacca for ship-to-ship transfers to vessels waiting at Singapore’s Eastern Outer Port Limits.
Trans Arctic Global is being designated under EO 13902 for operating in the oil and gas sector of the Iranian economy.
The Cameroon-flagged VIZURI (IMO 9197909), the Comoros-flagged FOTIS (IMO 9306548), the THEMIS (IMO 9264570) and the Panama-flagged BIANCA JOYSEL (IMO 9196632) together transported tens of millions of barrels of Iranian oil and other petroleum products worth billions of dollars.
Since mid-2023, VIZURI has completed multiple Iranian oil shipments and transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil. The Panama-flagged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tanker FOTIS has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG and other petroleum to multiple destinations. The Panama-flagged THEMIS, sanctioned by the UK on May 9, 2025 for transporting Russian oil, has also transported Iranian oil.
Egir Shipping Ltd, based in Seychelles, and Fotis Lines Incorporated and Themis Limited, based in Marshall Islands, are the respective owners of VIZURI, FOTIS and THEMIS. Egir Shipping Limited, Fotis Lines Incorporated and Themis Limited are designated under EO 13902 to operate in the oil sector of the Iranian economy. VIZURI, FOTIS and THEMIS are identified as blocked assets in which Egir Shipping Ltd, Fotis Lines Incorporated and Themis Limited have respective interests.
The Panama-flagged BIANCA JOYSEL has transported more than ten million barrels of Iranian oil since mid-2024, performing ship-to-ship transfers using sanctioned vessels owned by the US-designated NITC, including AMOR and STARLA.
Betensh Global Investment Limited and Dong Dong Shipping Limited, based in the British Virgin Islands, own BIANCA JOYSEL. Betensh Global Investment Limited and Dong Dong Shipping Limited are designated under EO 13902 to operate in the oil sector of the Iranian economy. BIANCA JOYSEL is designated as a blocked asset in which Betensh Global Investment Limited and Dong Dong Shipping Limited have an interest.
IRGC-QF Oil Sales
The IRGC-QF used the AI-Qatirji Company to facilitate the sale of oil to customers around the world, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for the IRGC-QF. The Cameroon-flagged ELIZABET (IMO 9216717), which impersonated a separate vessel, the S TINOS, loaded a cargo of Iranian oil off the coast of Malaysia in August 2024 via a ship-to-ship transfer. The initial cargo was loaded at Kharg Island, Iran, by the ROMINA (IMO 9114608), a vessel previously identified as carrying Iranian oil for the Al-Qatirji Company. Seychelles-based White Sands Shipmanagement Corp. is the management, operator, and technical manager of the ELIZABET.
AI-Qatirji Company transported approximately two million barrels of Iranian oil on the Cameroon-flagged vessel ATILA (IMO 9262754) in support of the US-sanctioned Sa’id al-Jamal network. ATILA received the oil in a ship-to-ship transfer using the sanctioned vessel ARMAN 114. The Iranian oil transported by ATILA was disguised as Malaysian oil. Seychelles-based Grat Shipping Co Ltd is the manager, operator, and owner of ATILA. OFAC designated Sa’id al-Jamal pursuant to EO 13224, as amended, on June 10, 2021, for supporting, financing, or providing financial, material, or technological support to, or goods or services to, or in support of, the IRGC-QF.
Al-Qatirji Company also used the Palau-flagged vessel GAS MARYAM (IMO 9108099) to transport Iranian petroleum products in support of the IRGC-QF. Liberia-based Dima Shipping & Trading Company is the management, operator and owner of the GAS MARYAM.
White Sands Shipmanagement Corp, Grat Shipping Co Ltd and Dima Shipping & Trading Company are being designated pursuant to EO 13224, as amended, for having assisted, sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support to, or goods or services to or in support of, Al-Qatirji Company. ELIZABET is being designated as a blocked asset in which White Sands Shipmanagement Corp. has an interest, ATILA as a blocked asset in which Grat Shipping Co Ltd has an interest and GAS MARYAM as a blocked asset in which Dima Shipping & Trading Company has an interest.
The meaning of sanctions
As stated in the actions announced today, all property and interests in property of the above designated or blocked persons that are in the United States or owned or controlled by U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Additionally, any entity that is owned directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, by 50% or more of one or more of the blocked persons is also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempted, OFAC regulations generally prohibit any transactions by U.S. persons or in (or transiting through) the United States involving any property or interests in property of the blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in civil or criminal penalties against U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guide provides additional information on OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. Additionally, financial institutions and other persons may be at risk of sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or blocked persons. Prohibitions include making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or accepting any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving today’s designated persons may risk secondary sanctions against participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC may prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintenance, in the United States, of a correspondent account or a payment account by a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a designated person under the relevant jurisdiction.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add individuals to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove individuals from the SDN List in accordance with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about positive behavior change. For information on the process for applying for removal from OFAC lists, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Applying for Removal from the OFAC Lists.
United States Department of the Treasury
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